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CHAPTER  21. 
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE AND DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES
GREGORY R. PETERSON
Introduction
Democracy and science, it might be thought, go hand in hand. As we commonly think of it, science has
its roots in the heritage of Greek thought, and the same is true of democracy. And while Athenian
democracy developed at best a complicated relationship with its intellectual luminaries, Athens was
nevertheless home to both Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum. Nearly two centuries later, the
scientific revolution most quickly took root in those nations that had come to have some semblance of
democratic rule. While the Republic of Florence had passed under Medici control by the time Galileo
was active, Newton’s home was then the most democratic nation on earth. During the Cold War, the
scientific achievements of the democratic West were often put forth as signs of its superiority over its
communist foes, and the existence of Soviet scientist-dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov supported the
narrative that the scientific enterprise, necessarily committed to the free exchange of ideas and the
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pursuit of truth even when socially inconvenient, simply cannot thrive in more oppressive contexts.
The truth is admittedly more complicated: scientists aided and sometimes enthusiastically abetted the
Nazi regime, and ongoing nuclear proliferation occurs only because of the many scientists—not all of
them coerced—willing to contribute to such efforts. But such cases seem to be the exceptions, and they
generally involve not the pursuit of science but its technological application. Genuine science plausibly
needs, if not democracy, at least adequate freedom of expression in order for ideas to be communicated
and critiqued. This was true enough in Galileo’s day that scholars had access not only to the great works
of the past but also, with some effort, the works of contemporaries.  On this account, if open,
democratic regimes do not actively cause the flourishing of science, they at least do not suppress it,
enabling the possibility of cumulative success over time.
But the arrow of causality may also run in the other direction. Democracy may not strictly need science,
but it may be the case that the scientific mindset contributes to the quality and integrity of democratic
forms of government. Indeed, one of the most persistent correlates to the emergence of democracy is the
level of its citizens’ education, a point first noted by Seymour Lipset in 1959 and which continues to
have significant support today.  Importantly, education is not the same as scientific education, and it is
quite possible that other features of education, including relevant components of civic education,
account for the relationship. Even so, it is plausible to think that scientific thinking and therefore
scientific training contribute to the quality and integrity of democratic regimes, and do so beyond the
merely instrumental material benefits that science provides.
This paper briefly explores the case for this proposal. In particular, I argue that what we should think of
as democratic virtues and scientific virtues overlap, and that, whatever other contributions science may
bring, encouraging scientific training in a way that contributes to character formation also has positive
political effects. First, I lay out a psychologically realistic account of moral and intellectual virtues, one
that critically engages contemporary dual-process models of cognition to argue for an account of virtues
in terms of integrated harmonic processing that involves both emotion and identity. Second, I introduce
the concept of democratic virtues, and I distinguish these from merely civic virtues that support political
institutions but not necessarily democratic ones. Although patriotism is a commonly named civic virtue,
one can be patriotic with respect to either democratic or undemocratic regimes. But there may also exist
specifically democratic virtues, including what we may call democratic trustworthiness, indicating a
kind of trustworthiness that is not group-oriented and inversely related to political corruption. Third, I
lay out the argument for scientific virtues as central to the conduct of science as a practice. Here I draw
on Alasdair MacIntyre’s conception of practices in After Virtue to explain why scientific practice
requires the development of both moral and intellectual virtues. Crucial to this argument is the
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social institutions that facilitate that practice. To some extent, my argument here parallels that of Daniel
Hicks and Thomas Stapleford, although their account is aimed at sociological analysis, not democratic
values.  As a practice, science requires the development of both moral and intellectual virtues. That
science requires intellectual virtues may seem initially obvious; that science requires the development of
moral virtues is perhaps less so. But scientific practice is very much social in character, involving
collaboration and mutual trust, and without these qualities present in the community, science cannot
advance. Fourth and finally, I bring these threads together. The virtues developed in the practice of
science and democratic virtues are intersecting sets, and some of the virtues developed as a consequence
of excellence in the practice of science, I argue, can and likely do contribute as well to democratic
functioning. While this is to some extent true of moral virtues such as those concerning trustworthiness,
the stronger influence likely comes from the intellectual virtues developed in the context of scientific
practice that serve to inhibit cognitive biases that can impair the wisdom of the crowd. I conclude by
citing some empirical studies that appear to point in this direction and that suggest a differentiation
between the impact of science education and education generally.
Although the argument I make is primarily philosophical and conceptual, the overall approach is
interdisciplinary. The study of virtue is no longer the province of philosophy alone, and it involves
empirical claims that touch on psychology in particular. Any discussion of democratic virtues that
claims to have empirical significance must engage other disciplines, notably political science, as well. In
this, the argument aims to model an approach that is interdisciplinary in character and that recognizes
the connections between philosophical argument and empirical impact.
The Idea of Virtue
When speaking of virtue, I use the term as is roughly typical in philosophical approaches to virtue,
which is to treat it as a specific feature or trait of character, and not as a global evaluation of character in
general, as it is sometimes used, both historically and in popular discourse. The term ‘trait’ itself is
somewhat problematic, as it can suggest a permanent feature that, like a genetic trait, is fixed and
automatic in its operation. The translation of the Greek hexis into Latin habitus to English habit is even
worse in this regard, suggesting a trait that is not only automatically activated but thoughtlessly so. For
Aristotle, virtues were not merely thoughtless habits, but dispositions produced by the “non-rational”
part of the soul that nevertheless operated in accord with reason.
Aristotle’s psychology, while insightful, is in important respects premodern, and while contemporary
virtue theorists generally agree in thinking of virtues as dispositions, they can mean very different things
by this. Some stress an externalist behaviorist account associating virtue primarily with the action
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genuine virtue theory must acknowledge a role for both. A purely behaviorist theory would not be a
genuine virtue theory at all, but merely a theory of moral behavior, and any such theory would likely
need to be construed either in strict terms of deontological action or consequentialist outcome in a way
foreign to most virtue theories that recognize the context-sensitivity integral to the concept of virtue.
Conversely, any theory that focused only on internal qualities such as emotion or motive would not be
able to discriminate between the truly virtuous and the merely well-intentioned. Many individuals mean
well and may feel appropriate compassion for the suffering or anger at injustice and yet never genuinely
follow through or, worse, become complicit in the acts they abhor. To be virtuous at a high level
involves not merely the appropriate motive and emotion, but the capacity to act in the right way at the
right time.
To say that virtues are traits is to imply that they are more than a matter of consciously willing the right
thing, and built into the concept of virtue is the idea that, as traits or dispositions, they are standing
features of character that are in certain respects automatic. In modern psychological parlance, virtues can
to some extent be explained in terms of contemporary dual-processing models that distinguish between
explicit cognitive processes accessible to conscious reflection and implicit cognitive processes that,
while possessing content, are in most instances consciously accessible in the form of intuitions or
emotion.  Dual-process models have limitations, and psychology tends to emphasize those cases where
processes conflict, what may be called “oppositional processing.”  Such oppositional processing
certainly occurs, and it provides a possibly satisfying explanation for the well-known philosophical
problems of weakness of will and conflict of will, perhaps best documented in early form by
Augustine.  In contrast, fully formed virtues are best characterized in terms of ‘harmonic processing,’
where implicitly formed intuition and emotion works in concert with our explicit decision-making. Such
harmonic processing appears characteristic of other forms of expertise, and a now substantial body of
evidence supports this claim.  On this account, the implicit processes constitute not mindless reflexes
but winnowed wisdom, formed by experience, narrative, and example. Such wisdom is both emotionally
embodied and deeply connected to the individual’s sense of moral identity. Thus, possessing the virtue
of moral courage involves more than the episodic flash of emotion and action that rises in defense of an
oppressed colleague, since such flashes may occur unreliably and, more importantly, not be deeply
connected in any way to character and long-term dispositions. True moral courage emerges precisely
because the being of one’s character is so aligned that in many cases, the proper expression of moral
courage is a regular feature of who one is. Such expressions are not wooden or inflexible, and part of
being truly courageous involves knowing when and how courage should best be expressed in a given
context.
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intellectual virtues.  Strictly speaking, intellectual virtues such as practical wisdom and understanding
are not moral virtues, although their proper functioning is important for the proper execution of moral
virtue. The distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is primarily one of domain; intellectual
virtues also involve integration with both emotion and identity. This may seem initially counterintuitive,
especially since we tend to see the operations of reason and emotion as not only distinct but even
diametrically opposed. We now know this claim to be largely incorrect, and a number of studies indicate
that severing the neural circuits integrating reasoning and emotional processes leads to severe deficits in
judgment, moral or otherwise.  Deeper reflection suggests how this is true. Although we tend to
stereotype rational reflection and activity—including scientific reflection and activity—as occurring best
in the absence of emotion, this is far from true.
Certainly, some emotions and mood states, such as anxiety, interfere with clear thinking. Most instances
of strong emotion are genuinely incompatible with deep explicit reflection on a problem, but scientific
reflection and rational reflection more generally are consistent with and supported by a range of
emotions, including the joy and pleasure one feels when solving a difficult mathematical or scientific
problem and the initial frustration one feels when results don’t turn out as planned. Frustration is a
negative emotion, and while it may impel the novice to abandon further rational reflection, the expert
will often find frustration itself a motivator. While it may not be strictly an emotion, the experience of
flow first diagnosed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi  also serves as a subtle positive reinforcement of
intellectual activity. Likewise, identity plays a crucial role, a fact borne out by the now numerous studies
on how self-perceptions and stereotypes of race and gender imposed by dominant groups can inhibit
mathematical and scientific performance. To do science requires being able to see oneself as a scientist,
and those who are unable to do so face internal barriers to achievement that can be difficult to
overcome.  Such achievement is particularly difficult in the absence of good mentoring and role
models.
Keith Stanovich has recently argued that while it is standard to divide cognition into dual-processes,
what we commonly think of as explicit processing can be further subdivided into algorithmic processing
and reflective processing.  While the former is characterized by the explicit rule-following
characteristic of simple arithmetic or the step-by-step development of a proof or argument, the latter is
characterized by more global assessments. While algorithmic processing consists in the kind of
rationality captured by IQ tests, reflective processing is characterized by “cognitive styles” that protect
against issues such as confirmation bias or my-side bias. Although Stanovich treats reflective processing
as explicit, it would seem to have a clear implicit component as well, and much of what Stanovich
describes as reflective processing bears more than a family resemblance to intellectual virtues.
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Although Aristotle spoke only in terms of moral and intellectual virtues, it has been common, especially
in recent decades, to speak also of civic virtues.  For the ancients, the distinction between moral and
civic virtue was not clear cut, and for Aristotle in particular moral virtues simply were civic virtues,
since a life of virtue for Aristotle was a life lived in the context of a Greek polis committed to the
flourishing of its citizens. This civic dimension of virtue revived with the rise of the Italian republics in
the Middle Ages, most notably Florence and Venice.  Although these republics defined themselves by
their opposition to tyranny and their commitment to citizen flourishing, they typically lacked many of
the ingredients we would now think essential to democratic governance. The point is an important one,
for while their legacy is frequently pointed to as an a important source for the concept of civic virtue,
influencing later reflection and debate on the topic in England and North America, the specifics of their
histories also highlight the fact that civic virtues are not necessarily synonymous with democratic
virtues, and it is conceivable to be, for instance, deeply patriotically committed to a regime that is
anything but democratic.
This raises an important issue regarding what should in fact count as a civic virtue. It might be thought
that civic virtues are simply moral virtues and that, for instance, patriotism in support of autocratic
regimes cannot be genuine patriotism because its aim is one contrary to proper human flourishing. In
this context, it is probably better to think of civic virtues more like the way intellectual virtues are
frequently conceived. Just as intellectual virtues are commonly thought of as qualities of character
distinct from moral virtues, so too should we think of many civic virtues as distinct from moral virtues,
and just as some intellectual virtues can be employed for bad ends, so too can civic virtues. But there
may also be virtues which either directly or indirectly support democratic institutions, and I will refer to
these as “democratic virtues.” Such virtues may also be intellectual, civic, or moral virtues, and while
some civic virtues such as generic patriotism may also serve to support democratic institutions, some
may also be distinctive in their support of democratic institutions and opposition to non-democratic
ones. These democratic virtues may not be present on traditional virtue lists, with one obvious reason for
this being that fully democratic institutions are a relatively modern invention. That a virtue is not named
does not mean it does not exist, only that it has not yet been identified.
Thus, patriotism as such may only incidentally provide support for democratic polities, but there may
also be a specific form of democratic patriotism, defined in terms of its commitment to not only one’s
own democratic institutions but also those of others. MacIntyre’s analysis of patriotism argues that we
should be skeptical of this.  On his account, patriotism is rooted in the values of a particular
community of which one is a part, and it is precisely because one is so rooted that one is willing to
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freedom unconstrained by prior commitments, is unable to generate such communal commitment, and as
such can never truly serve as the basis of a political system. But it would be a mistake to think that these
are the only two options, and a further mistake to think that participating in community and committing
oneself to democratic institutions, both at home and abroad, are mutually exclusive. A democratic
patriotism is one that distinguishes itself not by a nativist commitment to a national community but by a
commitment to the very principles and institutions of which one’s community is a part. Crucial here is
the kind of community with which one identifies, as well as how that identity is expressed. When the
community of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon risked its very existence to rescue Jews from the Nazis, for
example, they were not betraying their own community for the sake of others but precisely living out the
principles upon which their community was founded.
Such democratic patriotism would be but one instance of a democratic virtue, but others would be
important as well. A substantial body of literature points to the importance of trust and trustworthiness
for the success of democratic institutions, and surveys consistently show a significant correlation of
generalized trust and democracy.  But trust is at best only part of the equation, since it makes little
sense to trust individuals who are not in fact trustworthy. Whether or not we think of willingness to trust
as a virtue, gullibility—the disposition to trust excessively—is certainly a vice and a trait to be avoided.
But trustworthiness is a virtue and a democratic trustworthiness, committed both to the democratic
institutions of one’s country and to reliable exchange and relation with all of one’s fellow citizens and
not just those of one’s favored group based on class, sex, or race is arguably central to the persistence
and success of a democratic polity. It may be democratic trustworthiness that is measured by
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which correlates inversely with levels of
democratization.  Individuals with the virtue of democratic trustworthiness holding positions in public
institutions can find their character tested when those around them are corrupt, or when leaders who
come to power aim to corrupt public institutions to their own benefit. At such times, democratically
trustworthy individuals are forced to decide between their own short-term self-interest and their
commitment to the public good, and in particular cases they may feel required to act as whistleblowers
for the sake of the public interest.
Virtues of Scientific Practice
It is commonplace to think of science first and foremost in terms of its products, whether they be new
scientific theories or the capacity for technological achievements. But technological advancement
predates what we think of as modern science, as does the idea that science is a received body of
knowledge. Indeed, a central feature of the break between modern science and the received science
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to abandon the notion that science simply is such a received body of knowledge. What makes science
science is not the body of knowledge that it produces, but the way that such knowledge is produced. This
knowledge production requires certain kinds of practices that are sometimes both demanding and
difficult to learn. Training is thus essential, and training in turn requires the persistence of communities
of scientists committed both to maintaining the norms of practice and to passing the practices and their
norms to succeeding generations.
It is commonplace to render scientific practice into the conception of the scientific method, and then to
package the scientific method in such a way that it can be easily taught to students in science classes
learning both the content and practice of science for the first time. In this narrow view of scientific
practice, scientific practice just is a formulaic application of the scientific method, and in such contexts
the scientific method is often reduced to a simple script consisting of literature review, hypothesis
formation, hypothesis testing, and interpretation of tests in terms of confirmation and/or falsification.
The problems with this approach as an actual description of scientific practice are well-known, for it at
best significantly underdetermines what is involved in scientific practice and at worst significantly
misconstrues how scientific knowledge is generated. These points were first highlighted in a significant
way by Thomas Kuhn,  and subsequent generations of philosophers of science have sought with
varying degrees of success to resolve these issues.
A broader conception of scientific practice is thus needed. The idea that science is an enterprise
constituted by a set of practices will seem not at all strange to virtue ethicists. In his influential After
Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre lays out an account of practices in relation to the virtues, and he even briefly
alludes to science as a practice within which virtues are developed.  For MacIntyre, a practice just is a
cooperative human activity that is able to produce goods internal to the activity and in which there can
be demonstrated forms of excellence.  A simplistic game or activity like tic-tac-toe cannot be a
practice because it is not sufficiently complex to enable excellence or the production of internal goods.
Chess, however, is such a practice, and MacIntyre makes a point of emphasizing that, while the novice
chess player may initially play only to seek goods external to the game of chess itself (esteem of one’s
friends, prize in a competition), the experienced chess player is one who typically learns to internalize
the goods of playing chess and to value them in their own right. Certain virtues are required in the
playing of chess, and these must be developed through time, experience, and example in order to achieve
excellence at the game.
As a game, chess provides a very limited example, but MacIntyre’s analysis applies well to scientific
practice. While science may be pursued for goods purely outside of the practice of science, there also
exist goods internal to the practice of science, and the best scientists are often those who are motivated




Scientific Practice and Democratic Virtues – Virtue and the Practice of Science: Multidisciplinary Perspectives
https://virtueandthepracticeofscience.pressbooks.com/chapter/scientific-practice-and-democratic-virtues/[3/17/2021 10:02:46 AM]
development of certain moral and intellectual virtues. That the practice of quality science requires the
development of intellectual virtues is not surprising, given that we conceive of science primarily as a
rational activity—indeed, many would regard the practice of science as the practice of rational activity
par excellence. Plausible candidates for intellectual virtues important for the practice of science include
curiosity, perseverance, conscientiousness, and creativity.  Perseverance may not at first seem like an
intellectual virtue, but perseverance in intellectual activity can be an especially important quality for
scientists given that research projects often span years or even decades before promising results emerge.
Likewise, creativity is often underestimated as an important quality, in part because we often think skill
in science to consist largely of mathematical ability combined with in-depth knowledge of the subject
material. But the problems that science poses are often quite vexing, and finding a good scientific model
requires much more than simple Baconian induction. When we do recognize the importance of
creativity, we often then ascribe it primarily to creative geniuses such as Einstein, implying that
creativity is simply something one is born with: some people have it and some don’t. But in most
instances, creativity can to some extent be learned, and scientific creativity is made possible by both
deep training and deep knowledge of the material.
But as much as the practice of science requires intellectual virtues, it requires certain moral virtues as
well. Paramount to the practice of science is a commitment to truth, which requires both honesty and
integrity. Scientists who willfully fabricate data or results do significant damage to science as a practice,
since undetected fraud can lead to much wasted effort by other scientists and significantly damage not
only the careers of the scientists who rely on the fraudulent work but also the standing of science with
the public. Integrity—understood here as a form of moral courage in the face of adversity—comes into
play both with respect to fellow scientists and with respect to a sometimes hostile public that feels
threatened by the implications of a scientific theory. Not only may politicians exert pressure on scientists
to avoid areas of research that are controversial, corporations may seek to bribe or co-opt scientists to
hinder the spread of truths they find inconvenient.
Since science is often if not typically a collective endeavor, the development of a sense of fair play and
interpersonal justice can be crucial. The collaborator who brazenly insists that she be first author even
when she has only contributed modestly to a project will soon find herself involved in no projects at all.
Crucially, scientific fair play involves a commitment to treating scientific collaborators as equals
regardless of race or gender and regardless of personal attitudes towards politics and religion. In addition
to whatever moral injury is caused by failing to act fairly, successful scientific collaboration requires
both mutual respect and a sense of obligation to carry one’s own weight. When these are lacking,
collaborations break down or become ineffective. This social character of science is in some respects
distinctively modern, but it is important to note that science has always involved some level of
collaboration. The Royal Society was established in 1660, and it was founded precisely due to the
[27]
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perceived need for scientists to interact and productively disseminate and critique each other’s work.
Other relevant intellectual and moral virtues could be listed. While some of these virtues may already be
possessed to some degree by individuals who choose to pursue science as a passion or career, it is
important to note the central role that scientific exemplars and mentors can play in the development of
these virtues. This is perhaps most true of intellectual virtues, but it holds for moral virtues as well. Lead
scientists who run a lab poorly not only harm the careers of those who work there, they provide a poor
model of scientific leadership for those under them. It must also be noted that, while scientists
sometimes meet these ideals, many do so only partially, and some act contrary to the norms of science,
resulting in all too frequent cases of fraud and misrepresentation of data. As a robust and self-correcting
practice, science can often manage such cases. But as with any practice, excessive violation of standards
can erode the institution, even enough to cause collapse.
Democratic and Scientific Virtues as Intersecting Sets
It is perhaps obvious that, however we think of scientific virtues and democratic virtues, their relation is
not one of identity. Democratic patriotism may be a democratic virtue, but there is little reason to think
that it does or should play a role in the practice of science. Somewhat less likely, it may also be the case
that the practice of science in particular disciplines requires a damping down of particular emotional
reactions that are important to virtuous behavior outside the scientific realm. A number of studies, for
instance, show that medical doctors demonstrate lower levels of emotional empathy than average
individuals, a process that appears to develop during medical school as students find that continual
empathizing with patients is emotionally exhausting.  This can be problematic for effective
communication with patients, and a number of programs now exist to correct the problem.
But there are a number of cases where potentially interesting overlap exists for both moral and
intellectual virtues. As already noted, democratic trustworthiness is one potentially important virtue for
democratic societies. It is typically not enough to have well-structured institutions and laws that promote
trustworthiness, and it is not even enough to rely on a division of powers based on mutual self-interest as
a protection against untrustworthy individuals.  When democratic institutions are imposed on
countries by foreign powers, they often fail, and a central reason for such failure is that even well-
designed institutions can collapse when there exists insufficient commitment to the public good. How is
such commitment developed? Science as a practice does not directly aim at the production of democratic
trustworthiness, but, as mentioned earlier, the practice of science requires the development of honesty
and integrity. A scientific community that had an insufficient number of members committed to honesty
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complementary virtues, since an honest scientist who lacks the moral courage embodied in integrity will
be able to practice science effectively only as long as such science is uncontroversial and lacking the
significance to garner significant critical attention. The practice of science thus needs individuals who
will stand by their results even when it is unpopular to do so, whether the criticism comes from within
the scientific community or outside of it. In this context, it is important to note how such honesty and
integrity can conflict with the scientist’s own self-interest as normally conceived. In the short run it can
be advantageous to yield to criticism, pretend that the results were other than they were, and even in the
long run it may be prudent to simply shift focus to topics that are less controversial and possibly more
lucrative.
Nonscientists should regard science as a practice to be epistemically trustworthy in part because
individual scientists are morally trustworthy. And we might expect that once a scientist has internalized
the virtue of trustworthiness within the domain of science, the scientist will carry that norm into areas
outside of the practice of science. It would simply be embarrassing and provoke cognitive dissonance for
someone who is scientifically trained and who internalizes the norms of science to produce a business
report or the minutes of a meeting that were inaccurate, not simply because doing so might lead to bad
outcomes and not only because it would reflect badly on her if the mistakes were discovered, but
because doing so would be contrary to her understanding of who she is. Good scientists don’t falsify or
misrepresent data, and this is true whether operating within the context of scientific practice or outside
of it. More importantly, individuals who have had sufficient scientific training and have internalized the
values of science, whether they go on to a career in science or not, will share these values, and such
values, when integrated into a person’s identity, will impact the other domains of life.
We begin to see, then, how scientific trustworthiness begins to translate into democratic trustworthiness.
Very few professional scientists enter politics directly, but many who receive scientific training go on to
careers other than in science, including careers in the public sector or careers that disproportionately
influence those who are in the public sector. The institution of science contributes to the formation of
individuals who possess the virtue of trustworthiness, and these individuals then go on to participate in
other institutions, thereby affecting their trustworthiness as well. It is important to note that scientific
trustworthiness, much like democratic trustworthiness, involves a commitment to the principles of the
institution that transcend the interests of the group. This can produce painful dilemmas for scientists who
sometimes have to choose between their commitment to scientific principles and the commitments of,
for instance, co-religionists or political community.
Such a model is plausible, but we might also expect the results to be modest: not all professional
scientists internalize trustworthiness adequately, and those who receive lesser degrees of scientific
training will internalize trustworthiness to a lesser degree as well. It is plausible, therefore, that the
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intellectual virtues formed as result of participation in scientific practice play a larger role in the
functioning of democracy. One standard line of argument in favor of democracy as a form of
government is the claim that democracy benefits from the “wisdom of the crowd,” the idea that in some
contexts groups of individuals make better decisions than an individual does alone. First formalized by
Condorcet, modern scientists have observed a number of instances where group estimation of events
reliably predict future outcomes.  But, as Condorcet noted, the reliability of prediction depends on
whether members of the crowd have accurate information, and in some cases individuals make poorer
decisions when acting as part of a group than when acting independently. 
At least some of this difference in performance is explained by the existence of cognitive biases.
Cognitive scientists have diagnosed a substantial number of such biases. Confirmation bias and
variations thereof are perhaps the most discussed, but other biases include the anchoring effect and
hindsight bias.  Biases are not inherently bad, and many such biases operate effectively as heuristics
in the proper environment.  Take, for example, confirmation bias. If the great majority of one’s
judgments are well-formed, it will in most cases make sense to rely on such previously formed
judgments when encountering new information. If I am sleeping on a train traveling in Europe and wake
up to see Greek signs out the window, it is reasonable to infer that I am in Greece rather than that I am
passing through a movie set with Greek street signs. Biases become problematic, however, when they
activate improperly and contribute to faulty inferences. Confirmation bias can and often does go wrong,
and can in this sense be an intellectual vice.
Samuelson and Church have recently argued for an interpretation of the failures of cognitive biases in
terms of a lack of the virtue of intellectual humility.  They note that in the cognitive bias literature
most biases are understood to be failure of implicit processing, often referred to as Type 1 processing.
Further, they note that many of these biases are egocentric in nature: the failure of confirmation bias thus
gives improper weight to one’s own prior commitments. As a result, they argue, overreliance on such
automatic, implicit processing can be understood as a form of intellectual arrogance. Such individuals
lack intellectual humility, which requires an openness to the other as other and the willingness to
consider other sources of information as important as one’s own.
Samuelson and Church employ a default-interventionist model of interaction between implicit and
explicit processing that is slightly different than the harmonic processing account of virtue I have
proposed, but their argument supports the case I am making here: implicit processes are not simply
automatic but subject both to training and learning processes and to dynamic interaction with explicit
forms of processing. We all may have cognitive biases and we may all be susceptible to them to varying
degrees, but we are not all equally susceptible. If we are careful, we can learn to identify and to correct
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to better process information and make good judgments.
Scientific training and participation in scientific practice is one likely source, though not the only one,
for the development of intellectual virtues that protect against faulty cognitive biases. Scientific training
requires precision in reasoning and causal reasoning in particular, and good scientific training involves
recognition of cognitive biases that lead to errors both in interpretation of data and application of theory.
Heuristic rules such as “correlation does not necessarily imply causation” and “absence of evidence does
not necessarily imply evidence of absence,” or even “the simplest explanation is the best,” embody
principles important to the practice of science that are also context-sensitive and thus associated with the
cultivation of intellectual virtues. Good hypothesis testing involves principles of logical inference and
falsification, and the practice of science in general requires the development of a healthy skepticism
requiring skillful discrimination between reliable and unreliable sources of information.
It is relatively easy to see how the intellectual virtues inculcated in scientific practice benefit democratic
institutions, serving not merely as scientific virtues but as democratic virtues as well. If democracy is
dependent on the wisdom of the crowds, democracy can only function well if a sufficient proportion of
the crowd is able to interpret evidence appropriately. Much recent evidence supports the conclusion that
our political decision-making is subject to the same biases found elsewhere and that political decision-
making is further influenced by group identity and norms of judgment and, increasingly, by forms of
technology and social media that encourage forms of “enclave deliberation” reinforcing these effects.
Recent evidence suggests that college education in and of itself does not protect against these effects,
and the highly educated can be even more prone to partisan polarization about subjects such as climate
change in ways that suggest, at least sometimes, greater bias than the less-well informed.  There
seems to be a particular reason for this: many highly educated individuals have the same biases as less
educated individuals, but because they are typically better at explicit (Type 2) reasoning, they are also
better able to manufacture reasons justifying their already biased position. Such individuals would
appear to lack the intellectual humility championed by Samuelson and Church, although in these cases
the vice is located much more in the interaction between the forms of processing.
The fact that the highly-educated may be more biased and polarized in their handling of information may
seem surprising at first, especially given the extensive research showing a strongly positive relationship
between education and democratization. There are a number of possibilities here, but one possibility is
that the kind of education citizens receive is important, and the fact that most college students go into
fields other than science may be important. Students usually receive some science education in primary
and secondary education, and in many cases whatever additional science education they receive in
college only adds minimally to what they have already received. In addition, many of those who do
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receive science training do so in the context of professional training in such areas as engineering and
medicine, where the goal is not so much to learn how to be a scientist but to apply the results of
scientific knowledge to a particular professional field. Although such individuals would receive
considerably more exposure to science than individuals who pursue degrees in marketing or English,
their engagement with science as a practice may not be sufficiently different to distinguish the values
they internalize from those internalized by people with only a high school education.
More recent research by Kahan, et al, supports this general point,  providing evidence that possession
of a specific trait, science curiosity, counters biased reception of information and instead encourages
open engagement, even when the information received is contrary to a subject’s existing views. Further
research will be needed to support the empirical claim that scientific virtues positively impact political
decision-making, but my point here is primarily conceptual: if we understand what scientific virtues are,
we should realize that they are the kind of virtues which, when employed in the political sphere, support
democratic institutions and thus may be counted as democratic virtues. In particular, science as a
practice encourages and even requires the development of intellectual virtues that are also important for
the sustenance of democratic institutions. Given the small percentage of the population that is active in
scientific professions or that holds advanced degrees in the natural or social sciences, it might be thought
that even if there is such a positive impact, it must be quite small. But a couple of things could be said
here. First, a constituency does not have to constitute a majority to have a significant political impact,
and influential minorities can sometimes have substantial influence on the course of political
deliberation.  Second, we need not think of scientific virtues as being the sole possession of practicing
scientists; students who receive some modicum of training in primary and secondary education may
develop virtues such as scientific curiosity, even if only in attenuated form. But if this analysis is correct,
it suggests an added value to science education beyond its clearly economic value and the value of the
knowledge it produces. If done right, science education contributes to the development of scientific
virtues, and so also to democratic virtues. Science education is thus also civic education, providing an
additional reason to improve science education not only locally but also globally.
Conclusion
The argument developed in this paper is admittedly but a sketch, and more work needs to be done to
make it conceptually compelling. Particularly needed are philosophically useful phenomenologies of
scientific practice, which among other things would aid in our ability to identify relevant scientific
virtues and their potential impact outside their immediately relevant context. It is important to note in
this context that, while genuinely internalized scientific virtues may in fact contribute to the stability of
democratic institutions, this is very different from claiming that scientists are all intellectual or moral
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paragons. Quite the opposite: the history of science is replete with stories of scientists behaving badly.
Many practicing scientists are able to produce good science while never fully internalizing the virtues of
their scientific discipline, and many scientists are able to bracket their values while supporting morally
troubling or even clearly evil practices in other domains of their lives.
Further, we should understand the present impact of scientific virtues on democratic institutions to be
quite modest, given the relatively weak status of scientific education as a whole in the United States if
not in Europe. Stronger scientific education would undoubtedly improve the situation, but it is also
important to remember that the presence of scientific virtues is but one of many factors that can
contribute to strong democratic institutions, and likely not the most significant. Nevertheless,
democracies rely on an educated citizenry, and the wisdom of crowds can only be tapped if such wisdom
is in fact present.
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